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RACIAL PROGRESS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
ROADBLOCKS
JEREMY RABKIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
"Civil rights" has been a fierce political and ideological battle-
ground over the past two decades. Advocates of a "color blind"'
Constitution condemn group entitlements as subverting individual
rights and national cohesion.2 Defenders of racial preference poli-
cies, on the other hand, insist that only sustained government mea-
sures, including race-conscious remedial measures, can assure true
equality in the long run.' The Supreme Court in recent years has
questioned overt set-aside policies4 and begun to look with more
skepticism on the broad definitions of "discrimination" that invite
such policies., Congress, on the other hand, has shown its readiness
to resist judicial retrenchment with new legislation.'
No doubt the debate-with its attendant political and legal ma-
neuvering on each side-will be with us for some time to come.
The controversy already has attained a rather ritualistic quality,
however. And the debate may turn out to be largely misdirected.
To the extent that the Supreme Court figures importantly in com-
ing debates on "civil rights," those preoccupied with the minutia of
* Associate Professor of Government, Cornell University.
1. See, e.g., Morris B. Abram, Affirmative Action: Fair Shakers and Social Engineers, 99
HARV. L. REV. 1312, 1318 (1986).
2. Id. at 1322-23.
3. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HAzv. L. REv. 1415,
1503-05 (1989).
4. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
5. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (holding that a statistical
comparison demonstrating that whites are more greatly represented than nonwhites in bet-
ter, higher paying jobs does not make out a prima facie disparate-impact case); Firefighters
Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984) (reversing a decision that allowed a city
fire department to lay off white employees before laying off black employees with less se-
niority than the white workers).
6. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000e).
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equal protection doctrine, or judicial glosses on "civil rights" legis-
lation, may be looking in the wrong place.
II. WORSENING CONDITIONS
Almost none of those who urge a color-blind Constitution have
taken the argument to its logical extreme by urging the repeal of
the civil rights legislation of the 1960s. A truly color-blind govern-
ment, one might argue, would not be concerned about the effects of
private racial discrimination any more than it would be concerned
about private discrimination on the basis of political opinion or
differing standards in personal hygiene. Professor Richard Epstein
of the University of Chicago has defended this view, which appeals
to many libertarians. 7 Most champions of a color-blind Constitu-
tion, however, seem to reject it. They do so, it appears, because
they regard the effects of private discrimination-should they in-
clude large and continuing disparities between racial groups in eco-
nomic and social outcomes-as morally or politically intolerable.'
The problem is that two decades of government-sponsored pref-
erence schemes have done little to ameliorate the most dramatic
and intense disparities between the races-those due to the dispro-
portionate representation of racial minorities in the underclass of
the inner cities. Conservative commentators, most notably George
Gilder 9 and Charles Murray,"° argued this point with much force in
the early 1980s. Their calls for a radical rethinking of welfare pol-
icy, widely derided at the time, seem to have attained more re-
spectability in recent years." At any rate, the underlying trends
7. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMI-
NATION (1992).
8. David Strauss argued this point elaborately in The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 Sup.
CT. REV. 99. In fact, the point was acknowledged in one of the first sustained attacks on
racial preference schemes in its concluding section. See NATHAN GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DIS-
CRIMINATION: ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY 196-221 (1975).
9. GEORGE F. GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY (1981) (arguing that the current welfare sys-
tem will perpetuate poverty and lead to an increased social reliance on government
assistance).
10. CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND (1984) (stating that the welfare system provides
incentives to fail and offers no hope of success for those who are dependent on it).
11. See THE NEW CONSENSUS ON FAMILY AND WELFARE: A COMMUNITY OF SELF RELIANCE
(Marquette Univ. Working Seminar on Family and Am. Welfare Policy ed., 1987) for a thor-
ough treatment of the means to reduce welfare dependency. The Working Seminar con-
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which they emphasized are no longer in serious dispute. Overall,
the condition of blacks in America worsened during the 1970s and
1980s-the period in which affirmative action policies were most
vigorously pursued.12 Many blacks moved into the middle class in
this period and many of them may well have benefitted by affirma-
tive action policies.13 For many others, however, conditions of life
continued on a terrible downward spiral.'4
The National Research Council of the National Academy of Sci-
ences recently published a detailed survey on the condition of
blacks in America entitled A Common Destiny: Blacks and Ameri-
can Society. 5 It summarizes the overall experience of the last two
decades-precisely the period of the most intense enforcement of
antidiscrimination measures-in stark terms: "The greatest eco-
nomic gains for blacks occurred in the 1940s and 1960s. Since the
early 1970s, the economic status of blacks relative to whites has, on
average, stagnated or deteriorated."' 6 In the 1950s, for example,
unemployment rates for young people ages sixteen to twenty-four
were essentially the same for whites as for blacks. By the 1980s,
young blacks were two and one-half times more likely to be unem-
ployed than their white counterparts.' 7
Some scholars have attributed economic decline in the inner cit-
ies to broader changes in the American economy that have reduced
demand for unskilled labor. 18 The economic crisis, however, also
seems to be associated with a wider array of social pathologies,
which demoralizing economic conditions have aggravated greatly.
The collapse of normal family life is perhaps the most alarming
trend. As late as the mid-1960s, 75% of black households with chil-
cludes that welfare policy should impose on recipients the obligation to become self-suffi-
cient. Id. at 120-21.
12. See generally Louis S. Richman, Are You Better Off than in 1980?, FORTUNE, Oct. 10,
1988, at 38 (discussing the effects of affirmative action and other economic policies imple-
mented during the 1980s).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. COMMITTEE ON THE STATUS OF BLACK AMERICANS, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A COM-
MON DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY (Gerald D. Jaynes & Robin M. Williams, Jr.
eds., 1989) [hereinafter COMMON DESTINY].
16. Id. at 6.
17. Id. at 302-04.
18. WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED 39 (1987).
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dren under age eighteen were headed by married couples;" by
1986, more than half of such black families were headed by women
on their own.2" Similarly, at the start of the 1960s, less than 25%
of the total births among black mothers were out of wedlock;21 by
the mid-1980s, some 60% of black babies were born out of wed-
lock, compared to 12.5% among whites. 22
These are ominous trends. Not only are single mothers several
times more likely than their married counterparts to be dependent
on welfare or to be struggling to raise children on poverty-level
incomes,23 but, more importantly, the absence of fathers seems to
make parental discipline much more difficult.2 4 This is especially
true for single mothers trying to discipline teenage boys to ensure
that they stay in school and out of trouble with the police.25
The collapse of family life in the inner cities has therefore re-
sulted in a fearful upsurge in crime. The arrest rate for blacks
soared from approximately eighteen arrests per thousand individu-
als in the early 1950s to over 100 by 1978.26 Violent crime has be-
come so common that homicide has emerged as the leading cause
of death for young black men.27 Drug use has also increased dra-
matically, stimulating not just violent crime but fearful diseases
like AIDS. Intravenous drug use, a leading vector for the spread of
the AIDS virus, is so disproportionately centered in black commu-
nities that by 1987 half of all AIDS victims under the age of fifteen
were black, even though blacks form only twelve percent of the
population.2 8
19. COMMON DESTINY, supra note 15, at 528.
20. Id.
21. See id. at 518.
22. Id.
23. By 1978, 74% of all black families below the poverty line were headed by single
women. WILSON, supra note 18, at 27. For a more general discussion of this correlation, see
id. at 71-72.
24. Cf. JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 229-30 (2d ed. 1983) (discussing how the
loss of adult supervision resulted in lack of self-restraint among young men).
25. Id.
26. COMMON DESTINY, supra note 15, at 457-58. The comparable arrest rate for whites in
1978 was 35 per thousand. Id.
27. Id. at 415. In 1984, homicide rates among males aged 15 to 24 were 62 out of 100,000
for blacks, compared to 11 for whites. Id.
28. Id. at 419-20.
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Improving educational opportunities for black youngsters offset
some of this dreary news-but not much. Performance on stan-
dardized tests of educational achievement improved for blacks and
whites during the 1970s and 1980s, but painfully large gaps remain
between black and white median scores.29 High school graduation
rates improved for whites and blacks, yet black youngsters remain
twice as likely as whites not to finish high school.30 Black college
enrollment rates actually peaked in the mid-1970s, 31 displaying a
precipitous decline thereafter, while "the college entry rates of
whites rose almost continuously. 3 2 During the 1980s, blacks were
still only half as likely to have completed four years of college as
whites of the same age group.33
These somber facts do not prove that the civil rights measures of
recent decades have been counterproductive,34 but surely they
show that these efforts have been insufficient. The state of the in-
ner cities demands attention, whatever the ethnicity of the people
who live there. The fact that the social and economic devastation
of the inner cities falls disproportionately on blacks means that all
other talk about "integration," "racial equality," or "civil rights"
has a hollow ring.
III. SOLUTIONS AND ROADBLOCKS
What should be done? It is foolish, of course, to suppose that
any one program or measure can, by itself, make a dramatic differ-
ence in existing trends. The continued deterioration of life in the
inner cities cries out for alternative approaches, but when one
looks at various promising options, one encounters judicial prece-
dents blocking the path. These precedents are, for the most part,
decisions and doctrines from the same era that generated the failed
29. Id. at 348-49.
30. Id. at 338.
31. Id. at 339.
32. Id. Thirty-six percent of black high school graduates entered college in 1986, com-
pared with 57% for whites. Id.
33. Id. at 340.
34. Some scholars do argue that these measures have been counterproductive insofar as
they have reinforced a demoralizing message to racial minorities and encouraged schools not
to hold minority students, or others, to appropriate standards. See MURRAY, supra note 10,
at 172-75.
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strategies of contemporary "civil rights" programs, yet they do not
relate directly to civil rights in this conventional sense. Because
the problems involved are by no means exclusive to blacks, reme-
dial measures need not be race-specific, but they may require
changes in existing doctrine. The underlying issue, then, is not
whether courts will allow policies that take account of race but
whether courts will allow policies that take account of reality.
Start with education. It is perfectly clear that big city school sys-
tems largely have failed in dealing with inner city youth.15 Wide
agreement exists that alternative education strategies are impera-
tive: different schools, different kinds of schools, greater choice
among schools for parents and students s.3  Entrenched interests,
such as teachers' unions and education bureaucracies, resist greater
choice as a threat to their own secure positions."
Other models of schooling exist, however, which could be
adopted on a large scale in inner cities. For example, commenta-
tors have noted that parochial schools tend to do a much better job
in imparting the discipline and self-respect needed for orderly
learning.38 The superiority of parochial schooling has proved to be
true in this respect even with inner city children whose parents are
not Catholics but nonetheless strive to enroll them in Catholic
schools.3 s  Yet, proposals for subsidizing parochial educa-
tion-which might make it more widely available-were repeatedly
struck down by the Supreme Court in the 1970s and 1980s on the
grounds that such subsidies undermine the First Amendment guar-
35. JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 8
(1990).
36. Id. at 199-215.
37. See, e.g., Jill Zuckman, New Bill Kills Federal Money for Private School "Choice,"
CONG. Q., Feb. 29, 1992, at 471 ("Detractors [of a school choice bill], including the two main
teachers' unions, the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) and the National Education
Association (NEA), fear that sending public money to private schools will erode public edu-
cation and ultimately risk their professional livelihoods."). The subtitle of this report on
recent political clashes in Congress clearly summarizes the controversy: "Pressured by
School Boards, Teachers' Groups, [House Education and Labor Committee Chairman Wil-
liam D.] Ford Scraps Compromise with White House." Id.
38. JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., HIGH SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENI. PUBLIC, CATHOLIC AND PRIVATE
SCHOOLS COMPARED 186-91 (1982).
39. Id. at 194-96.
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antee against establishment of religion.40 A Court which was quite
ready to embark on such bitterly divisive measures as mandatory
busing programs for school integration claimed that aid to relig-
iously affiliated schools would be too divisive.41
The Court may now be prepared to take a different view on the
question of aid to religious schools, at least where the government
aid goes directly to parents or students rather than schools.42 This
different view will not necessarily end the problems, however.
Many programs for expanding choice seek to operate through pub-
lic schools, but doctrinaire advocacy groups have already suc-
ceeded in imposing a range of limitations on the discretion of pub-
lic schools. For example, some educators think it may be helpful to
separate boys and girls, at least in early years, because boys tend
to be much more restless and aggressive, becoming frustrated and
repelled by the orderly classroom routines to which girls adapt so
readily. At the least, this experiment in separate-sex schools seems
40. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (holding that a program similar to that in
Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), led to excessive entanglement of
church and state and violated Establishment Clause); Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473
U.S. 373 (1985) (holding that use of public school teachers to teach nonreligious subjects in
nonpublic schools is violative of Establishment Clause); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229,
255 (1977) (holding that state provision of "books, standardized testing and scoring, diag-
nostic services, and therapeutic and remedial services" is constitutional, and provision of
"instructional materials and equipment and field trip services" is unconstitutional); Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (holding that state statute authorizing provision of "auxiliary
services" of public schools to private school students and loans of public school textbooks
and instructional materials to private schools is violative of Establishment Clause); Levitt v.
Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (holding that state support of both regular
and standardized testing in nonpublic schools is unconstitutional); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971) (holding that state statutes providing public money to supplement nonpub-
lic school teacher salaries are violative of Religion Clauses).
41. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622-23 ("[Plolitical division along religious lines was one of
the principal evils against which the First Amendment was intended to protect.... [Debate
over religious issues would] tend to confuse and obscure other issues of great urgency.").
42. See Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (uphold-
ing a state vocational rehabilitation program even though a student used program aid
money to finance religious studies). The Court's recent ruling in Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct.
2649 (1992) (holding that clergy's offering prayers at an official public-school graduation
ceremony violated the Establishment Clause), suggests that predictions of an increasingly
accommodationist approach to separation of church and state questions may be premature.
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worth trying, but courts have held mandatory segregation based on
sex unconstitutional.43
Other reformers have sought to experiment with more restrictive
dress codes or requirements for uniforms. These are logical ideas
that encourage orderliness while eliminating distracting competi-
tion over styles of dress; private schools in the United States and
public schools in other countries have long used them. Courts have
held, however, that there is a constitutional right not to have
schools impose student dress codes.44
Similarly, court decisions in the 1970s insisted on restricting
school discipline procedures so that public schools cannot readily
suspend disorderly students.45 This troublesome precedent would
seem to apply as much to alternative or choice schools within the
public system as to others, because it is grounded in abstract con-
stitutional doctrines linking public education, per se, to the consti-
tutional obligations of the state.4"
Even if choice programs open up opportunities to private educa-
tion, such legal problems will not necessarily end. In the past two
decades, courts have been intent on pursuing segregationist or dis-
criminatory impulses in private schools, developing doctrines that
make it difficult for any school to remain beyond the reach of gov-
ernment standardization. For example, the Supreme Court has
held that receiving a tax exemption is enough to make a private
school subject to equality standards. 47 Receiving eligibility for
cashing student vouchers may be sufficient to do the same. Court
decisions imposing standardized norms have therefore hobbled ef-
forts to extend the range of choice and we are thus back to where
we started.
43. In Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), aff'd per curiam, 430 U.S.
703 (1977) (4-4 decision), a voluntary program of single-sex high schools in Philadelphia was
upheld against an Equal Protection challenge. At least one circuit, however, has held a
mandatory segregation program unconstitutional. See United States v. Hinds Sch. Bd., 560
F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1977).
44. See, e.g., Wallace v. Ford, 346 F. Supp. 156 (E.D. Ark. 1972). In Wallace, the court
held that a school administration bears the burden of establishing the necessity of infringing
upon students' freedom to govern personal appearance. Id. at 161-62.
45. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (requiring that due process be satisfied
before student suspensions are allowed).
46. Id. at 576.
47. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
[Vol. 34:75
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Similar problems exist in dealing with drugs and crime, the
greatest scourges of inner city neighborhoods. Society cannot re-
duce drug dependency without driving out the drug dealers who
make it so easy for new users to get started. Congress indeed has
authorized vast sums of money and increasingly severe and draco-
nian penalties to attack the drug trade.48 Yet when faced with
measures to protect the people most at risk from the pernicious
consequences of drug dealing, courts have recoiled from enforce-
ment efforts in the name of abstract due process doctrines from
the sentimental 1960s.
To take the most telling example, Congress, in a 1984 measure,
authorized federal officials to seize the assets of drug dealers even
before trial,49 to ensure that enforcement efforts would hit hard
and quickly at their targets. Under the Bush administration, the
Justice Department and the Department of Housing and Urban
Development developed a program under this statute to go after
drug dealers in federally funded housing projects.5 0 This program
targeted dealers who already had two prior convictions on drug of-
fenses and faced accusations of continuing to deal drugs in their
housing projects.51 The Fourth Circuit ruled recently that this pro-
gram violates the due process rights of the drug dealers, 52 who
therefore have a right to stay in public housing-continuing to deal
crack cocaine to teenagers and pregnant women-until given an
opportunity to defend themselves in a formal hearing. Because te-
nants in such cases are eligible for federally funded Legal Services
lawyers, and drug dealers can use the proceeds of their trade to
secure much more extensive or aggressive legal assistance, eviction
proceedings may continue to drag on, while the tenant stays in
place, plying his death-dealing wares.
Courts have sanctioned the authority of the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration to seize dangerous food or pharmaceutical products
48. See, e.g., 1991 Crime Bill, S. 1241, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (proposing harsher
penalties for drug-related crimes).
49. 21 U.S.C. § 881(b) (1988).
50. See Michael Isikoff, Bennett Unveils Plan to Combat Washington Drug Crisis; Ex-
panded U.S. Role Includes New Prisons, Additional Prosecutors, WASH. PosT, Apr. 11,
1989, at Al.
51. Id.
52. Richmond Tenants Org., Inc. v. Kemp, 956 F.2d 1300 (4th Cir. 1992).
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immediately and reserve legal proceedings until after the fact 3 be-
cause speedy action may be required in such cases to save lives. 4
Do the lives of people-and their babies-in public housing
projects not mean so much to federal judges as the health of ordi-
nary consumers? At any rate, courts do not now see such dispari-
ties as "civil rights" issues.
A similar air of unreality exists in court doctrines inhibiting
more general crime-control efforts. Because the problems in some
areas are extremely severe, some dramatic coping measures have
recently been proposed. James Q. Wilson, a political scientist and a
leading authority on crime control, recently proposed that the gov-
ernment allow crime-ridden neighborhoods to experiment with
''perimeter control" under which "through streets can be blocked
off and guards placed at the entry points." 55 The idea of the propo-
sal is to provide decent people in very poor neighborhoods with
some of the security that affluent people now purchase in gated
private communities or guarded urban highrises. Wilson acknowl-
edges that such neighborhood controls will "lessen the opportunity
to move freely about the city,"56 but he insists that "there is no
other way to take guns out of the hands of those people most likely
to use them, to end the control that street gangs have over neigh-
borhoods, and to keep drug dealers from dominating the economy
of a community. '57
Alan Keyes, one of the few black candidates for the United
States Senate in 1992, has argued for a more ambitious version of
neighborhood self policing,58 by which urban neighborhoods would
53. 21 U.S.C. §§ 334-335 (1984). In Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry Ind., 339 U.S. 594
(1950), the Supreme Court allowed the FDA to make summary seizures of a food supple-
ment that the FDA conceded was not immediately dangerous, but was still misbranded. For
similar seizures of products not posing imminent danger to health, see United States v. An
Article of Drug... Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784 (1969); AMP, Inc. v. Gardner, 389 F.2d 825
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 825 (1968).
54. Ewing, 339 U.S. at 601.
55. James Q. Wilson, Human Nature and Social Progress 16, Bradley Lecture, American
Enterprise Institute (May 9, 1991) (transcript available at AEI).
56. Id. at 18.
57. Id. at 18-19.
58. Interview with Alan Keyes, Republican candidate for the United States Senate for the
State of Maryland (Mar. 1992). Keyes has been urging this program in speeches throughout
the state of Maryland, where he has been campaigning. At the time of publication, he had
not yet issued a formal statement of his proposal.
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be empowered to make ordinances for proper behavior in the
streets, which could then be enforced by local "militias" of student
volunteers and by locally appointed "justices of the peace" with
power to punish misdemeanors with fines or service obligations. 59
The point of the plan is not so much to arm communities against
dangerous criminals-Keyes concedes that regular police and
courts will always be required for that 6°-but to make neighbor-
hoods less inviting targets or recruiting grounds for drug dealers
and dangerous criminals. The underlying notion is that crime
breeds most readily in neighborhoods already so full of vandalism,
disorder, and hooliganism that the more vicious criminals can
move about freely there without any fear of attracting attention.
Keyes argues that his "militia" brigades, in the course of patrolling
against ordinary delinquency, could be "spotters" to call in regular
police against the most suspicious outsiders.6 1 At the least, he ar-
gues, they would rid patrolled neighborhoods of the open-air drug
markets, where addicts and dealers brazenly congregate and are
now so common in big cities like Baltimore.2
Such proposals will encounter many political and practical ob-
stacles and will not work everywhere. As Wilson argues, however,
"doing these things for even a few people will save some lives and
reclaim some streets" 63 and will provide valuable proving grounds
to show which of these methods work. 4 Even where a willingness
to experiment with such neighborhood "perimeters" or "patrols"
exists, however, participants will encounter difficulties from the
courts unless the Supreme Court modifies the approach it has
maintained over the past twenty years. In the 1960s and 1970s, the
Supreme Court struck down traditional vagrancy laws because
they were excessively vague65 and threatened the First Amend-
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Wilson, supra note 55, at 19.
64. Id.
65. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972); see also Palmer v. City
of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 (1971) (holding that a "suspicious person ordinance" was unconstitu-
tionally vague).
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ment's right of assembly.66 More recently, the Court displayed hos-
tility to laws authorizing the police to require loiterers to identify
themselves.6 7 Lower courts following this lead have struck down
local laws banning panhandling in the subways68 and "annoying"
readers in public libraries,69 and they have been unsympathetic to
laws that prohibit loitering for the purpose of begging.70 Courts
still working with the whimsical imagery of the 1960s-the Su-
preme Court invoked the example of poets like Walt Whitman,
wandering idly through city streets, to explain its opposition to va-
grancy laws7 -can make it impossible for neighborhoods to cope
with the daily assaults on their basic security. On which side is the
cause of "civil rights"?
IV. CONCLUSION
No one suggests that the First Amendment or the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment should cease to apply in
crime-ridden or poverty-stricken neighborhoods. The question is:
with what spirit or attitude will courts interpret existing constitu-
tional guarantees? Thirty years ago, almost all lawyers and legal
scholars would have been surprised to think that a single federal
district judge could be authorized, in the name of the Constitution,
to take over the routine management of the Boston public
66. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965); see also Coates v. City of
Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (striking down an ordinance which made it a criminal of-
fense for three or more persons to assemble on a sidewalk and conduct themselves in a
manner annoying to passersby).
67. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
68. Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 729 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other
grounds, 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990). The reversal stressed the special circumstances of the
subway. Young, 903 F.2d at 158.
69. Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 765 F. Supp. 181, 195 (D.N.J. 1991), rev'd, 958 F.2d 1242
(3d Cir. 1992). Apparently going against the trend, the Third Circuit stated that "[tihe dis-
trict court's opinion unduly restricts the Library's authority to circumscribe admission to
and expulsion from its facility and gives short shrift to its significant interest in achieving
the optimum and safest use of its facilities." Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1246.
70. Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 766 F. Supp. 1280 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (refusing to
grant a summary judgment motion to the city and thereby uphold the constitutionality of
the begging law). The court saw many First Amendment issues at stake, as indeed there
were if the precedents cited above remain fully binding and generously interpreted.
71. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972).
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schools 72 or to impose racial hiring quotas on the Alabama police
force.7 3 Courts sharply modified traditional constitutional norms
during the 1970s to accommodate what they then viewed as the
cause of "civil rights" or "racial progress." No one now expects
courts to remedy the failures of that era by ordering the establish-
ment of a comprehensive school voucher policy or by cordoning off
neighborhoods and mobilizing neighborhood militias to patrol
them. The question is simply whether courts can bear to drop the
edifying but wildly unrealistic doctrinal extensions of an earlier
era. The question, in short, is not whether courts will help but
whether they will get out of the way
Because the doctrines of past decades have strong, organized
supporters, 4 however, getting the courts out of the way will entail
much debate. Such debates will be more to the point if we recog-
nize that the outcomes have much bearing on the future of life in
the inner cities, and, in that sense, on what is now called "civil
rights."
72. For a comprehensive history of the federal judiciary's involvement in the administra-
tion of the Boston public schools' desegregation and affirmative action policies, see Morgan
v. O'Bryant, 671 F.2d 23, 24-25 (1st Cir. 1982).
73. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
74. See, e.g., Helen Hershkoff & Adam S. Cohen, Begging to Differ: The First Amend-
ment and the Right to Beg, 104 HARV. L. REV. 896 (1991) (interpreting the First Amend-
ment and Supreme Court cases to mean that begging would be a fully protected form of
speech); Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 39 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 295
(1991) (arguing that traditional concepts of freedom and property rights should be modified
to protect the interests of society's homeless and destitute).
19921
